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An Incomplete Job Description
Rachel Bradshaw
Abstract
The importance of public education in democratic states is almost beyond dispute. Too often, though, 
discussions of democratic education focus solely on policies and systems, forgetting the individual 
teachers who are ultimately responsible for educating future citizens. This paper attempts to illustrate 
just how complex and significant the role of teachers in a democratic republic can be.
I recently watched the 2011 film American Teacher, which aims to raise awareness about the plight of primary and secondary public school teachers in the United States. Its 
diagnosis of the problem is simple enough: Teachers do too much work 
for too little pay. The documentary shows teachers exhausted from 
working 60- and 70- hour weeks, teachers working second jobs to 
support their “teaching habit,” teachers forced to leave the profession 
for a job that will provide for their families. These situations are tragic, 
and raising awareness of them is worthwhile. But the film’s most 
important point is one it hardly touches upon.
Rhena Jasey is the only American teacher who emphasizes the 
“intellectual rigor” of her profession. She points out that teachers 
must make “thousands of decisions every moment— not about 
abstract concepts but about children’s lives.” She explains that 
presenting complex ideas and information in ways that are 
comprehensible to young minds is a profoundly demanding task. 
And she cites the refrain, too familiar to many of us: “Anyone can 
teach, but you have an Ivy League education. You could do any-
thing. Why become a teacher?”
When people ask this question, they are not implying that we 
should find a job with shorter hours: Many Ivy Leaguers work 
20- hour days as consultants. They are not implying that we should 
avoid drudgery: Many Ivy Leaguers put themselves through 
graduate school by grading exams and serving lattes by the 
thousand. They are not even implying that we should earn more 
money: Many Ivy Leaguers take $20,000- a- year jobs at publishing 
houses or as adjunct professors. No, what the puzzled question 
suggests is that we should find a job that is intellectually fulfilling— 
and that teaching is not that.
If this phenomenon resulted only in the mild discomfort of an 
overprivileged few, it would hardly be worth mentioning. But the 
misconception it illustrates— that teaching is not an intellectual 
endeavor— threatens the very foundations of our political system.
To observe that democracy relies upon education is common-
place. Less frequently articulated are the ways in which democracy 
relies specifically upon teachers and teaching. No matter how 
thoughtful and thorough our curricula, policies, or procedures, 
democratic education ultimately takes place between teachers and 
students. It is teachers who must navigate what Brann (1989) calls 
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the “paradoxes of education in a republic.” These are difficulties 
that cannot be resolved in the abstract or codified out of existence 
but instead require careful and continual management by those 
who face them every day.
American Teacher does allude in certain subtle ways to the 
possibility of seeing teaching as more than hard labor or charity 
work. In comparing United States teachers to those in higher- 
achieving countries, it mentions not only that the latter are better 
paid but also that they are an elite group and respected as such.  
The founder of The Equity Project, the New York charter school 
that pays its teachers upwards of $125,000 a year, notes in his 
interview that “if you pay teachers more, you change the percep-
tion of what it means to be a teacher” (i.e., that higher salaries may 
be necessary but are certainly not sufficient to recruit and retain 
highly skilled educators). But on the whole, the film’s portrait of 
teachers invites more pity than awe.
Yet democracy’s teachers must be more than martyrs. Public 
school teachers in the United States today teach about democracy, 
with democracy, for democracy, in democracy, outside democracy— 
even before and after and during democracy. Indeed, almost any 
English preposition can fill in the blank, and to gloss over the 
complexities of teaching _____ democracy is to undermine both 
teaching and democracy. This paper therefore commits to struggling 
with those complexities in all their frustrating untidiness.
The sections below attempt to illustrate three major elements 
of democratic education: popular control over schooling, student 
voice and choice in schools, and tolerance of differences. The goal 
here is not to define these (admittedly nebulous) concepts theoreti-
cally; rather, it is to begin— barely!— the task of describing just 
what it is we need from our nation’s teachers.
Popular Control of Schooling
Consider first the position of teachers in a democracy. They are 
public servants, for (at least in theory) our schools are subject to 
democratic control. At first glance this ideal seems to relieve them 
of a great burden: In order to further our society’s democratic 
ideals, they need only do whatever their communities ask of them. 
If the populace wants them to teach evolution, they teach it. If it 
votes for a creationist curriculum, so be it. After all, as Gutmann 
(1987) reminds us, “Being an expert in education is neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient condition for claiming authority over 
education in a democracy” (p. 80). Local businesses, universities, 
elected officials, and especially parents all have stakes in the future 
of their community and its children. If proper democratic proce-
dures are in place, many difficult decisions about how to educate 
children can be settled by votes, meetings, and other means of 
ensuring popular control over schooling. Perhaps educators 
themselves need worry only about technical questions of how best 
to teach the knowledge and skills valued by the community.
Difficulties arise almost immediately, however. Most obvious is 
the fact that our democracy is a constitutional one, designed explicitly 
to make impossible a “tyranny of the majority.” Gutmann (1987) 
herself defines democracy as majoritarian rule constrained by the 
twin principles of nonrepression and nondiscrimination— 
constraints far from trivial and ones to which I will return below in a 
discussion of tolerance and pluralism. A teacher must have the 
knowledge and capacity to eschew repression and discrimination no 
matter what any school board or parent- teacher association says. This 
is not only a matter of preserving citizens’ rights in the present but 
also a way of protecting the future, as Gutmann (1987) makes clear:
If democracy did not extend over time, we might best discover what a 
community values on any particular occasion by collective deliberation 
followed by unconstrained majority rule. The temporal dimension of 
democracy requires us to ask whether the results of majority rule make 
future decisions undemocratic either by restricting citizens’ capacity for 
deliberation in the future or by excluding some citizens from full 
participation in future deliberations. (pp. 95– 96)
Perhaps this task is formulaic enough: Teachers should heed 
the demands of their communities, unless those demands violate 
anyone’s constitutional rights, in which case the latter take prece-
dence. As long as laws and procedures are legitimate, teachers need 
only defer to them in order to ensure that the education they 
provide is democratic.
But that would be too easy. Here is Gutmann (1987) again:
When democratic control over primary [and secondary] schools is so 
absolute as to render teachers unable to exercise intellectual discretion in 
their work, (1) few independent- minded people are attracted to teaching, 
(2) those who are attracted are frustrated in their attempts to think 
creatively and independently, and (3) those who either willingly or 
reluctantly conform to the demands of democratic authority teach an 
undemocratic lesson to their students— of intellectual deference to 
democratic authority. (p. 80)
In other words, teachers who focus too much on teaching in 
democracy might fail to teach for democracy— to prepare their 
students to be independent- minded citizens of the sort essential to 
the maintenance of a healthy democratic state. As Moe (2000) puts 
it, “This is one of the ironies of democracy: the schools have 
difficulty contributing to the quality of democratic government 
precisely because they are democratically controlled” (p. 142).
There is no escaping from this conundrum, for it goes without 
saying that tyranny is as undesirable as demagoguery— that 
teachers who ignore the voices of their communities or violate 
their students’ constitutional rights are no more democratic than 
those enslaved to popular opinion.
This is why every teacher of democratic citizens stands . . . in the 
methoria. The responsibility to teach places the teacher between the 
consensus of his or her age and the unknown future. . . . Thus, the 
teacher must construct the space of the pedagogic between the ideals 
and the vocabulary and self- understanding of the given society. 
(Steiner, 1994, p. 124)
In short, neither teaching in democracy nor teaching for 
democracy can be sacrificed. A teacher must have the intellectual, 
social, and ethical agility necessary to balance these two functions, 
never losing sight of either even when they seem directly opposed 
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to each other. With this requirement comes another: to avoid 
eternal battles of conscience and will between self and community, 
a teacher must not only balance contrary interests but also bring 
them into dialogue with each other. After all, our democracy is not 
only representative but also deliberative, dependent not only on the 
vote but also on debate, persuasion, and consensus building. Again, 
Steiner’s (1994) grandiloquence is perhaps not unwarranted: “The 
community must be persuaded of the fallibility of its own judg-
ment, of the responsibility of its educators to broker the difference 
between its self- understanding and the silences, the blindness, 
which that self- understanding has induced” (p. 124).
Thus, the democratic principle of allowing communities input 
into their children’s education, far from relieving teachers of 
responsibility for making controversial decisions, instead requires 
that they both respect the decisions of others and model autono-
mous decision making for pupils who will one day be deciding the 
fate of their own communities and children. No theory can 
determine when each of these tasks should take precedence over 
the other; only human ingenuity and sensitivity will suffice. It is the 
teacher, not the procedure or the rule, that makes education 
democratic— or not.
Student Voice and Choice
Thus far the teacher job description includes someone adept at 
balancing the constitutional, procedural, and deliberative aspects 
of democracy: someone with acute sensitivity to discriminatory 
and repressive practices, someone who understands the demands 
of the community being served, and someone skilled at communi-
cating personal values and justifying professional practices when 
they challenge public opinion (as in some cases they should, if the 
teacher is to guard effectively against the “tyranny of the majority”). 
But the above discussion may have implied that teaching  for 
democracy— that is, preparing students to be good citizens— is a 
relatively simple task once one learns how to manage teaching in 
democracy. Nothing could be further from the truth.
For one thing, even the verb preparing is problematic. Steiner 
(1994) claims that “education, for Dewey, is about the preparation 
of citizens who will engage in the constant reconstruction of the 
public sphere” (p. 129), but Dewey would presumably object to 
Steiner’s use of the future tense here. Dewey (1974) sees education 
as “a process of living and not a preparation for future living”  
(p. 430). He says, “The process and goal of education are one and 
the same thing” (p. 434), and any education whose telos lies outside 
itself is no education at all. Dewey is emphatic on this point, which 
he sees as the very crux of education reform. The futile attempt “to 
prepare future members of the social order in a medium” set 
entirely apart from that order constitutes “the tragic weakness of 
the present school” (p. 301). That is why, once his vision is realized, 
school will no longer be “so set apart, so isolated from the ordinary 
conditions and motives of life” (p. 302); it will instead be “a minia-
ture community, an embryonic society” (p. 303). Brann (1989) 
observes that “the question whether educational institutions 
should be isolated from, or extensions of, ‘life,’ is of great impor-
tance in the pedagogy of a republic” (p. 45). Dewey, it seems, would 
not hesitate in choosing the latter option.
If he is right, then students should be citizens and not subjects 
of their schools, which must be democratic institutions if they are 
to teach students how to function in the larger democracy that is 
society. Teaching for democracy must not entail teaching outside of 
or prior to some other democratic existence; the pedagogical act 
must instead embody authentic democracy in the here and now.
Again it seems at first glance that democracy takes a great deal 
of pressure off the individual teacher. Perhaps all that is required of 
teachers is that they respond to the needs expressed by their 
students. After all, serving the populace in true democratic fashion 
precludes imposing one’s own will on it. Constitutional provisions 
for the protection of minorities still apply, of course: If a group of 
students votes to steal one child’s lunch money and share it among 
themselves, their teacher must intervene, limiting democracy for 
its own sake by upholding Gutmann’s principles of nonrepression 
and nondiscrimination. Nevertheless, the rule seems clear enough. 
Defer to procedural democracy unless it flouts constitutional 
democracy, and the education you provide will be appropriate.
At least two objections present themselves, however. First, 
procedural democracy is hardly a monolithic force in itself. What 
happens, for instance, if students’ wishes contradict their parents’? 
Whom are teachers to serve, and how can they serve either or both 
without, as above, failing to model the personal autonomy their 
students need to learn in order to contribute to and benefit from the 
democracy in which they live? Second, students are by definition 
not yet qualified to be citizens. Children neither vote nor serve on 
juries because society deems them incapable of fulfilling such 
responsibilities; how, then, are teachers to treat them as fully 
competent decisionmakers?
It may be said that the decisions students make in schools do 
not have such weighty consequences as those a voter or juror 
makes— that deciding what to study or what game to play is 
precisely a way to practice, in a low- stakes setting, the skills 
students will need in the future. It turns out, though, that class-
rooms are terribly high- stakes environments. In a commentary on 
The Social Contract (1762),1 Steiner (1994) observes:
On the issue of openness Rousseau would be amused by the 
contemporary exhortation to allow “students and teachers to negotiate 
which courses, if any, are to be required.” This, in Rousseau’s view, would 
be to expect students to judge the quality of a knowledge they had yet to 
encounter. The product of such an education would not be freedom but, 
instead, its reverse: children incapable of delayed gratification, of 
schooling their impulses or accumulating knowledge. (p. 192)
That is, “the same principle that requires a state to grant adults 
personal and political freedom also commits it to assuring children 
an education which makes those freedoms both possible and 
meaningful” (Gutmann, 1987; qtd. in Steiner, 1994, p. 11). Thus, 
teachers who make their students sovereign over their own learning 
in an excess of democratic fervor may undermine their own efforts to 
teach _____ democracy by ultimately constraining their students’ 
ability to take advantage of their democratic freedoms. Put differ-
ently, “the pedagogical problem is how to protect the spontaneity of 
genuine thinking and prevent abdication to experts while developing 
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the competence to gauge and use the experts’ competence with some 
authority” (Brann, 1989, p. 127). Here then is yet another balancing 
act required of teachers by democracy: they must be authorities on 
how to challenge authority, experts on how to question expertise— 
teachers of both future citizens and present- day pseudocitizens, 
people who must exist before, during, inside, and outside democracy 
all at once. It is a “pedagogical problem” indeed.
It is worth noting that more than the future happiness of 
children is at stake. First, Steiner (1994) explains:
Protagoras challenged the earliest citizens to find in themselves and 
their experience the measure of all things. But his invitation is fraught 
with difficulty. How can such citizens educate themselves to measure 
more effectively? If the standard against which citizens are to hold 
their judgments is a mirror, how might one give a public definition of 
that standard? If every citizen is a sovereign measurer, what role 
remains for a class of educators? (p. 184)
Given the limitations of children, the student- teacher 
relationship is even more problematic than the citizen- sophist one 
Steiner describes. Teachers must challenge their students to think 
for themselves, but they must do so without renouncing their own 
authority as adults and as educators. Otherwise, they teach 
themselves out of a job, calling into question the very existence of 
their profession. Further, quoting Rousseau, Steiner (1994) asks,
“How will a blind multitude, which often does not know what it wants 
because it rarely knows what is good for it, carry out for itself an 
undertaking as vast and difficult as a system of legislation” (Social 
Contract, p. 67)? Citizens cannot simply rely on the wisdom of their 
compatriots, for this would be expecting the impossible: “men would 
have to be prior to laws what they ought to become by means of the 
law” (p. 69). (p. 117)
The passage could be rephrased (and stripped of its rather 
antidemocratic sentiment!) by pointing out that, given too much 
power over their own schooling, students would have to be prior to 
education what they ought to become by means of that education. 
If a student is high- achieving enough to be placed in an advanced 
track but would rather stay in lower- level classes, how does that 
student’s teacher best serve democratic purposes? Does the teacher 
defer to the student’s interests or encourage the child to “fulfill his 
potential”? It is up to the teacher neither to assume preexisting 
decision- making competence nor neglect to develop that compe-
tence in the children the teacher leads. If the teacher fails on either 
count, democracy itself will fail, for people doomed to “blindness” 
will never succeed at governing themselves.
Local control over educational agendas, student voice and 
choice in schools, abhorrence of discrimination and repression,  
the value of thinking for oneself— every educator in the country 
must be acutely aware of all these aspects of the role as a teacher 
_____ democracy. It is upon teachers’ everyday practice, upon the 
continual negotiations and adaptations without which they cannot 
manage their paradoxical role in society, that the strength of our 
democracy hinges. In short, the system does not create the 
pedagogy; the pedagogy creates the system.
Teaching Tolerance
Thus far the constitutional aspects of democracy have appeared largely 
as prohibitions against wrongdoing. Teachers can focus on the more 
technical aspects of their jobs as long as they avoid violating anyone’s 
rights, one might think. When Gutmann defines the nonprocedural 
aspects of democracy in negative terms— as nonrepression and 
nondiscrimination— she echoes a long tradition of “live and let live” 
rhetoric that in this country dates back at least as far as Thomas 
Jefferson. Take, for instance, Jefferson’s arguments for keeping 
religious dogma out of the public schools. For him, religion is private, 
government is public, and these facts are reasons enough to keep them 
apart. “I have ever thought religion a concern purely between our God 
and our consciences” (1816, para. 1), he explains, and “our civil rights 
have no dependence on our religious opinions, any more than our 
opinions in physics or geometry” (1786, para. 1). Further, “the 
legitimate powers of government extend to such acts only as are 
injurious to others. But it does me no injury for my neighbor to say 
there are twenty gods, or no god. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks 
my leg” (1787, Query XVII, para. 2). From a public school teacher’s 
point of view, all of this suggests that the teacher need not and should 
not worry about students’ religious or other beliefs unless they actively 
cheat or hurt other students. For Jefferson, though, this last caveat is 
unnecessary. Why would disagreements about the number of gods 
ever have the power to harm anyone?
The answer, of course, is that religious (and other) debates are 
rarely so circumscribed. They are not only abstract discussions of 
whether the Trinity is one god in three or three gods in one; they are 
often fundamental disagreements over the most concrete aspects of 
our private and public lives: how to dress at school, whom to date or 
marry, what to eat in whose company. When one student in a 
classroom holds forth on the sinfulness of abortion and homosexu-
ality, for instance, in the presence of a student who has had an 
abortion and another who is gay, then taking a hands- off approach 
may actually cause psychological harm to the listeners or impede 
their ability to learn. A teacher’s silence may be interpreted as an 
abdication of responsibility to educate all children rather than as 
strict attention to duties as a representative of the government. This 
danger is perhaps greater now that our society is much more diverse 
than it once was, but I would venture to propose that even in 
Jefferson’s time religious debates could be fairly personal affairs. It is 
difficult to see how simply ignoring students’ religious opinions— or 
their differences in general— could ever have been a simple or 
fail- safe option for any public school teacher.
Indeed there is a certain disturbing thread of apathy, of civic 
disengagement, running through Jefferson’s writing. He claims he 
“never yet saw an instance of one of two disputants convincing the 
other by argument” (1808, para. 1). Of course, the careful and 
sympathetic reader will conclude that he is warning only against 
angry dispute, not against reasoned debate. A few sentences later, 
though, he touts Benjamin Franklin’s stated policy of never 
contradicting anyone and adds:
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When I hear another express an opinion, which is not mine, I say to 
myself, He has a right to his opinion, as I to mine; why should I question 
it. His error does me no injury, and shall I become a Don Quixot to bring 
all men by force of argument, to one opinion? If a fact be misstated, it is 
probable he is gratified by a belief of it, and I have no right to deprive him 
of the gratification. . . . It is his affair, not mine, if he prefers error. (para. 1)
Here is a sublime level of tolerance, an attitude that would 
improve many a classroom and society. But it is what Pangle and 
Pangle (2000) call “a tolerance that is a ‘mere’ toleration: a thin 
pluralism of coexisting but mutually indifferent or hostile multicul-
tural posturings” (p. 24). Their diagnosis is this:
The balances delicately articulated in our original, founding public 
philosophy have been decisively tilted: rights have eclipsed 
responsibilities, freedom has obscured virtue, tolerance has rendered 
suspicious the passing of moral judgments, and concern for 
autonomous choice has come to outweigh concern for human 
fulfillment found in dedication and devotion. (p. 23)
All of this translates into yet another delicate balancing act 
required of teachers in the United States today. On the one hand, 
they must heed Jefferson’s warnings against embarking on quixotic 
quests to convert the world to their own beliefs. On the other hand, 
open- minded teaching must mean more than condescending to 
humor those who are doomed to “error.” There are ways to teach 
without dogma, to tolerate without indifference. Jefferson once 
struggled to define such strategies in theory; educators must 
struggle every day to define them in practice. Otherwise, they risk 
teaching only apathy or resentment.
What these texts and others give teachers are not rules; they 
are guidelines that require continual interpretation and adaptation 
in ever- changing contexts. Like democratic control over schools 
and democratic training within schools, tolerance of pluralism 
requires individual teachers capable and aware enough to make an 
unending series of tough decisions about how best to educate 
_____ democracy.
Conclusions and Implications
Steiner (1994) is admirably forthright on the subject of translating 
theory into practice:
What all theorists implicitly hope for (present company included) is a 
process of benign trickle- down. Those who make education their 
profession are, through some mysterious symbiotic process, to be made 
aware of our ideas and understand how and when to modify them for 
practical use. (p. 198)
He knows of course that the “mysterious symbiotic process” 
cannot be carried out by anyone but teachers themselves. Thus his 
conclusion, which follows pages and pages of confidently worded 
abstractions, is replete with phrases like “teachers would be free to 
select . . .” (1994, p. 201), “the teacher may judge . . .” (p. 203), “as ever,  
it is the teacher who will negotiate the tension . . .” (p. 205), “only the 
individual . . . teacher can gauge . . .” (p. 205), and “teachers should be 
free to select . . .” (p. 209). In the end there is no escaping the obvious: 
all the negotiating, all the balancing and compromising and 
juggling— all the complexity democracy demands of its educational 
systems— all this is manifest nowhere more clearly than in everyday 
interactions between individual teachers and their students.
Of course, teachers need not bear sole responsibility for the 
vitality of our democracy. The goal of this paper is to recognize the 
challenges teachers face, not to increase them. Non- teachers too 
must play a role: distributing resources, promulgating mission 
statements, designing administrative structures, holding school 
board elections, establishing student governments, developing 
curricula, engaging families and communities, writing laws, 
enforcing regulations— all these are important and indeed indispen-
sible aspects of public education in a democratic republic. But they 
are also insufficient. Administrators, policymakers, and curriculum 
designers can help design democratic education systems, but they 
cannot ensure democratic teaching. Only teachers can do that.
Thus, teacher training programs must recruit and educate 
candidates capable of rising to all the challenges of teaching _____ 
democracy. School administrators must support and demand 
acuity and discernment, not drudgery or self- sacrifice, from their 
faculty members. Policymakers must understand how pedagogy 
interacts with policy in the realm of democratic education. Most of 
all, though, teachers must understand just how important they are.
Notes
 1. See The Social Contract, or Principles of Political Right, 
available online at http://www.constitution.org/jjr/socon.htm
References
Brann, E. (1989). Paradoxes of education in a republic. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago.
Dewey, J. (1974). On education: Selected writings. R. D. Archambault (Ed.). Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago.
Gutmann, A. (1987). Democratic education. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University.
Jefferson, T. (1786). The Virginia act for establishing religious freedom. Retrieved from 
http://religiousfreedom.lib.virginia.edu/sacred/vaact.html
Jefferson, T. (1787). Notes on the state of Virginia. Retrieved from http://avalon.law.yale 
.edu/18th_century/jeffvir.asp
Jefferson, T. (1808, November 24). [Letter to Thomas Jefferson Randolph]. Retrieved  
from http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/presidents/thomas- jefferson/letters- of- thomas 
- jefferson/jefl187.php
Jefferson, T. (1816, August 6). [Letter to Mrs. Samuel H. Smith]. Retrieved from http://
www.let.rug.nl/usa/presidents/thomas- jefferson/letters- of- thomas- jefferson/
jefl247.php
Moe, T. M. (2000). The two democratic purposes of public education. In L. M. 
McDonnell, P. M. Timpane, & R. Benjamin (Eds.), Rediscovering the democratic 
purposes of education (pp. 127– 147). Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas.
Pangle, L. S., & Pangle, T. L. (2000). What the American Founders have to teach us about 
schooling for democratic citizenship. In L. M. McDonnell, P. M. Timpane, &  
R. Benjamin (Eds.), Rediscovering the democratic purposes of education (pp. 21– 46). 
Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas.
Roth, V., & McGinn, B. (Directors). (2011). American teacher [Motion picture].  
United States.
Steiner, D. (1994). Rethinking democratic education. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University.
